How to send files anonymously
What anonymity actually requires when sending a file, which parts a service can help with, which parts are on you, and how to avoid the mistakes that undo it.
"Anonymously" gets used loosely. Before choosing a tool it is worth being precise about which of these you actually need, because they require different things:
- The recipient should not know who sent this.
- The service carrying it should not know what it is.
- Nobody should be able to link this transfer back to my identity later.
- Nobody should be able to tell I sent anything at all.
Most tools address the second one. The fourth is genuinely hard and needs Tor, not a website. This article is mostly about the first three.
Where identity leaks in a normal file transfer
Think about what an ordinary upload reveals, in order:
The account. This is the big one. Any service that requires signing up now holds an email address or phone number that is almost certainly linked to your real identity — and a record of every transfer you made. Deleting the file later does not delete that record.
The file itself. Documents carry astonishing amounts of metadata. A Word file records the author name, the organisation, and often the editing history. Photos carry EXIF data: camera model, serial number, and frequently GPS coordinates accurate to a few metres. A PDF exported from InDesign names the machine it was made on. This is the most common way anonymity fails, and no transfer service can fix it for you.
The filename. resignation_letter_final_JSmith.docx defeats the purpose regardless of how well it is encrypted.
The network connection. Your IP address identifies your connection to any server you contact. Encryption does not hide it.
The content. Writing style, specific details, internal references. Nothing technical helps here.
What a good tool can do
A service can meaningfully help with two of these.
No account. If creating an identity requires no email, no phone number and no payment, there is no identity record to correlate. This is more important than it sounds — it removes the entire category of "the service was breached and the account list leaked".
End-to-end encryption. If the file is encrypted on your device before it is transmitted, the service cannot inspect it, cannot fingerprint it, and cannot hand over its contents. It also cannot be forced to, which is a different and stronger property than promising not to.
What no service can do is scrub your file's metadata or hide your IP address from itself. Be suspicious of anything that claims otherwise.
The steps, in order
1. Clean the file before you send it.
This is the step people skip, and it is the one that actually matters.
- On Windows: right-click the file, Properties, Details, "Remove Properties and Personal Information".
- On macOS: for images,
exiftool -all= filename.jpgin Terminal, or open in Preview and export without location data. - For photos generally: re-saving through a basic image editor usually strips EXIF, though not always. Verify rather than assume.
- For documents: export to PDF, then check the PDF's properties, which often inherit the author field. Or copy the text into a fresh document.
- For anything sensitive: consider whether a screenshot of the content is sufficient, since screenshots carry almost no metadata.
2. Rename it to something neutral.
document.pdf rather than anything descriptive.
3. Use a service that requires no account.
Sign-up is the biggest single source of correlation. If you must use something that requires an email address, use one that is not yours and has never been used for anything else — but understand that a service that has your email is a service that can be compelled to produce your email.
4. Consider your network.
Your IP address is visible to the service regardless of encryption. If that matters for your threat model, use Tor Browser. A commercial VPN moves the trust rather than removing it — the VPN provider then knows what your ISP would have known, and their no-logging claim is exactly as verifiable as everyone else's.
For most ordinary purposes — sending a contract, a medical record, a photo you would rather not have on a company's servers — this step is unnecessary. Be honest about which situation you are in rather than performing security theatre.
5. Send the pointer out of band.
If the recipient needs an alias, a link or a code, sending it through the same channel you are trying to avoid defeats the point. Say it on the phone, in person, or through a different service.
6. Do not sign it.
Sounds obvious. Tools that offer an optional "from" field make it easy to fill in reflexively.
What AliasCloak does and does not give you
Does: no account, no email, no phone number, no payment. A mailbox is a key pair your browser generates. Files are encrypted on your device before upload, so we cannot read them, cannot preview them, and cannot produce them in readable form if asked. Once collected, our copy is deleted. There is an optional sender-name field, and leaving it blank is the default.
Does not: strip metadata from your files — do that yourself, before uploading. Hide your IP address from our servers, though we do not store it in raw form. Prevent your recipient from knowing it was you, if the content makes that obvious.
We are explicit about this on the security page, including the parts that are limitations rather than features. Any tool that will not tell you what it fails to protect is not being straight with you.
A realistic worked example
Say you want to send a signed contract to a lawyer without it sitting in two email accounts forever.
- Export the contract to PDF. Check the PDF properties and clear the author field.
- Rename it
contract.pdf. - Ask the lawyer to create a mailbox — one click, nothing to sign up for — and send you their alias.
- Open AliasCloak, enter the alias, attach the file, leave the sender name blank if you want to, and send.
- They collect it. Our copy is deleted on confirmation.
Nothing about that transfer is recorded anywhere in a form that says who you are or what the file contained.
Create a mailbox — it takes a second and asks for nothing.
Keep reading
Private by design
