Security
What we can and cannot see
Security claims are only worth anything if they are specific enough to be checked. Here is what AliasCloak uses, what that buys you, and — the part most products leave out — where it stops.
The cryptography
Everything is standard libsodium. The primitives are established, but their integration into AliasCloak is an application protocol. This review does not constitute an independent cryptographic audit.
| Used for | Algorithm | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Key exchange between mailboxes | X25519 (crypto_box) | 32-byte keys, generated in your browser |
| Message bodies and metadata | XSalsa20-Poly1305 | Authenticated encryption; tampering is detected, not just decryption failure |
| Files and large payloads | XChaCha20-Poly1305, streaming | 64 KB frames with a final-frame marker, so truncation is detectable |
| Proving you own a mailbox | crypto_box_seal (anonymous sealed box) | The server seals a random challenge to your public key; only your private key opens it |
| Optional second factor | TOTP (RFC 6238) | New/untrusted sessions require a current code; trusted-device tokens are random, hashed server-side and expire |
What this protects against
Anyone reading your messages in transit, including us and our hosting provider
A database breach exposing message contents or files — there is no plaintext to steal
A legal demand for your message contents, which we cannot produce in readable form
Requiring an email address or phone number for the core mailbox. Optional paid custom aliases use Stripe and therefore create ordinary payment metadata outside the encrypted message layer
A tampered message being accepted as genuine — every payload is authenticated
What it does not protect against
Any tool that will not tell you this is selling you something.
A later compromise of a mailbox private key. This protocol uses long-lived mailbox keys and does not provide forward secrecy or a Double Ratchet.
Unverified recipient keys. Alias lookup trusts the server directory; compare public-key fingerprints through another trusted channel for sensitive conversations.
A compromised device. If malware or another person has access to your browser, they have your private key.
Your recipient. Once they can read a message, they can screenshot it, forward it, or keep it forever.
Traffic analysis by someone watching your network. We do not see message contents, but an observer can see that you connected to AliasCloak and roughly how much data moved.
A malicious or compromised version of this website. Like every browser-based encryption tool, you are trusting that the code served to you is the code we intend to serve.
Losing both your private key and every usable encrypted backup. The server cannot reset your key or decrypt a backup for you.
Developer mail has two trust modes
The app encrypts mail and chat on the sending device. The developer send-encrypted API also accepts ciphertext produced by the sender. The convenience send API receives plaintext on the server before encrypting it for the recipient; that mode is not end-to-end encrypted from the sender. Its messages are labeled server-encrypted in the inbox. The content-protection claims above apply to browser-encrypted and sender-encrypted messages.
Sign in with AliasCloak
The optional OpenID Connect provider uses Authorization Code with mandatory PKCE and exact registered redirect URIs. Each relying-party sector receives a pairwise pseudonymous subject derived with a server-held secret, so unrelated sites do not receive the mailbox UUID or a shared universal login identifier. The only optional identity claim is the current AliasCloak alias, and the consent screen leaves that disclosure unchecked by default. The identity service has no scopes for messages, chats, files, contacts, private keys or backups.
Closed-app notifications and badges
If you explicitly enable browser/device notifications, AliasCloak can use Web Push to wake an installed PWA after new mail or chat activity. The server sends an empty push payload; the service worker supplies only the fixed text “You have new activity” and sets a generic app-icon badge. Sender identity, alias, subject, message text, conversation identifiers, unread counts and encryption keys are never put in a push. Exact unread counts are calculated locally after the app runs. AliasCloak uses distinct push subscriptions per mailbox and per mail/chat channel rather than deliberately sharing one endpoint across local identities.
Quiet-hour schedules remain local. Because browsers require closed-app push to be user-visible, a mail/chat channel covered by configured quiet hours does not register a closed-app push subscription at all; open-app alerts still use the exact local schedule. Push subscriptions are optional, revocable, and removed when a mailbox is forgotten/deleted or when the push service reports that an endpoint has expired.
What is stored, and for how long
Public keys and aliases are retained to route messages. They are persistent identifiers and can be linked to people or activity, even when no real name is supplied. For one-shot mail sent to one or many people, the browser encrypts the payload once and wraps its random content key separately to each recipient. Each recipient has an independent encrypted delivery record; the shared encrypted text body is removed after every intended recipient has acknowledged successful local decryption, while encrypted attachments remain only until their retention deadline. Group-chat message metadata/captions are encrypted once with a fresh content key, and that small key is wrapped separately to every member who is in the group when the message is sent. File ciphertext is likewise uploaded once. A person who joins later does not receive the earlier key envelopes, so they cannot decrypt earlier group history. One-shot mail uses a two-tier retention window: seven days on primary storage by default, followed only for still-unacknowledged deliveries by up to 30 additional days on optional cold storage when that archive volume is available. If the archive is absent at the hot cutoff, the message is deleted instead; fully acknowledged mail is not promoted simply to keep it longer. All cold data is the same browser-produced ciphertext and continues to count against sender quota. Encrypted chat history is retained for a limited window so reconnecting devices can catch up, then removed. IP addresses are never stored in raw form; where rate limiting needs an identifier, a keyed hash is used instead.
We do not use advertising trackers. Stripe is loaded only on the optional custom-alias payment flow and never receives message plaintext. Optional TOTP adds a second factor to new/untrusted session issuance; enabling it invalidates other active sessions, and a successful code check can trust that browser with a random token whose hash is stored server-side.
Reporting a vulnerability
If you have found a security issue, please get in touch before disclosing it publicly. Include enough detail to reproduce it. We will respond, and we will not threaten anyone who reports a genuine problem in good faith.
Private by design
